Commercial lawyers often signal that 'client first' is an essential element of their DNA, and some scholarly proponents have laid claim to a moral justification for zeal. That moral justification is found, in particular, in the notion of lawyers as friends. One critique of zeal is that this moral claim is bogus: that 'client-first' is a convenient trope for disguised selfinterest. This paper explores the empirical validity of this 'client-first' ideal through a valuebased analysis of zeal in lawyering. Our data suggest plausible differences in ethical decisionmaking related to those values. The data is consistent with more zealous lawyers having stronger self-interested rather than client-interested motivations. More zealous lawyers are also less constrained by valuing conformity to rules. If our results are valid, they suggest that the claim that zeal is motivated by placing a high value on the interests of the client is false.
can also ultimately damage the interests of the client and the lawyer.
In the academic literature, such debates have often been the focus of a moral philosophical inquiry, centred on whether it is possible to be a good lawyer and good person.
14 Where the law and professional rules are unclear, can a lawyer be a good person if they assist clients with probably illegal actions where there is an argument that the action may be legal? Can The jurisprudential philosophy of zealous advocacy tends towards answering these questions with a yes, albeit sometimes a qualified yes. 15 The justifications for doing so and in particular the reasons for dedicating oneself as a lawyer to zealous advocacy are partly centred on individual rights and pluralism. 16 Pepper and Dare argue that the client rights should be prioritised and not inhibited by a lawyer's queasiness about the morality of advancing those rights or by lawyer's doubts about the extent of those rights in law. In uncertain situations, in matters of law and legal process, the zealous lawyers should give effect to the client's rights and promote their client's priorities over their own. Markovits suggests lawyers, 'should try aggressively to manipulate both the facts and the law to suit their clients' purposes.'
17
A justification for zealous advocacy from moral philosophy makes a particular virtue of prioritising another's interest (the client's) over all others, with the lawyer deriving moral worth from selfless dedication to the client. Indeed, Charles Fried in his seminal piece on the 'Lawyer as Friend' argues that:
[In] relations -friendship, kinship -we recognize an authorization to take the interests of particular concrete persons more seriously and to give them priority over the interests of the wider collectivity.
18
For Fried, paying special attention and prioritising the client's rights is intrinsically justified:
this, 'preference grows out of the profoundest springs of morality: the concepts of personality, enough to have taken a risk which pays off are likely to be rewarded as these tend to advance the firm, whereas the pay-off from refusing to take a risk is the status quo (or worse, lower revenue) with reward less likely. Thus the strongest positive feedback mechanism is towards risk-taking and personal gain:
An above-average tolerance for legal risk and a 'flexible' cognitive style in evaluating such risk are survival traits in settings where corporate strategy and its surrounding culture are strongly attuned to competitive success.
36
The research suggests that the law firm environment, and the structures of promotion and esteem, suggest a bias towards risk taking, reduced objectivity and increased zeal in advocacy which may serve to encourage less than ethical decision-making founded on self-interest. As well as environmental factors, individual personality may play a role in response to professional legal ethical dilemmas, as we will demonstrate shortly. In reaching a decision in this context, the decision-maker draws on both deontological evaluations centred on rightness or wrongness in relation to law, professional rules and, more intrinsic values and evaluations of the likely consequences of the decision. These evaluations require an objectivity which is in tension with overt pressures and subconscious biases that can lead them to seek to lean towards the client in ways which 'can have a particularly strong distorting effect' on objective professional judgment. will have a constrained commitment to ordinary moral values and a stronger commitment to the role specific moral values of fidelity and zeal. She must be able to accept or live with a level of dis-integrity in her moral person, and be willing to be highly contextual in her moral analysis.
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In this way, Woolley and Wendel can be read as seeing zeal as consistent with Fried's emphasis on the lawyer as a friend, but with a diminished valuing of personal morality. It is this interest in an 'individual's personal features …her dispositions, personality, character, cognition, emotions' 41 and the idea that it may have an important role in risk taking and ethical decision which our research here speaks to.
Some circumspection
In what follows we concentrate on an individual's psychological motivations, but we should emphasise that we are not arguing that personal characteristics or general biases account for the entirety of a person's behaviour. Indeed, legal decision-making reflects the complexities of the situations that present themselves to lawyers, how they are presented to them and how they are interpreted by them. some would be found elsewhere (rule-following is an element of conformity and the referent for courage in Schwartz may be best found in self-direction).
Of particular interest to us in this paper is any relationship between values and zeal. As we have seen, proponents of zeal tend to rely on claims of justice, equality and rights. This would lead one to expect zeal to be associated with universalism. Other defences centre on the concept of friendship, fidelity and responsibility to the client. The best referent for this in Schwartz' model is benevolence, the valuing of the welfare of those close to us (in-group members). Although this raises the interesting question of who constitutes the in-group. For in-house practitioners, is it colleagues, senior executives or a broader group of stakeholders;
for private practice lawyers would their colleagues, clients or (say) the profession constitute the in-group? The logic of Fried's defence of zeal suggests the clients ought to be regarded as the in-group, so relying on benevolence as a proxy for 'client as friend' is strongly suggested.
As discussed benevolence and universalism are values encompassed within the overarching motivation of self-transcendence: concern for the welfare and interests of others. In theory, if zealous advocacy is underpinned by universalism and/or benevolence we would expect zealous lawyers to value benevolence and universalism more highly than less zealous lawyers.
We would have a new empirical basis for accepting that zeal was authentically linked to self- 
Looking at value motivations associated with ethical decisions
In the studies that follow we were able to evaluate the value preferences of lawyers and examine any relationships between value preferences and decision-making on ethical problems. For our ethical problems, we use scenarios described below where the more zealous pursuit of a client interest is not clearly prohibited but is associated with a more ethically risky approach to a problem. For proponents of zeal, the balance between public and client interest is a balance to be struck in favour of the client. As we have seen the philosophical justifications for that are founded either in justice claims or benevolence (client friendship) claims. We test whether the underlying psychology reflects those justifications.
The data was collected from two different surveys; the first was 56 in-house counsel (junior to senior lawyers) recruited from a large financial services provider, the second included 100 practising lawyers of which 68 lawyers came from one very large private practice firm and 32
senior lawyers in a variety of commercial in-house positions.
Both samples are convenience samples. They were contacted by their employer or the private practice firm, and invited to respond anonymously to our online survey. Wedo not have population data or random sampling to test representativeness. Our results do not represent all UK lawyers, however the data does provides unique insight into the relationship between
individual personal values and zeal in practicing lawyers.
Survey Instruments and Value Profiles
The participants were invited to complete a survey which contained several elements. The first element was the psychometric test of value priorities, using the ten dimensions Schwartz scale in the first survey and the more detailed 19 dimension scale in the second survey.
Respondents are asked to read a series of descriptions of a person and think about how much each person is or is not like them; statements such as:
 Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things her own original way.
 Being very successful is important to her. She likes to impress other people.
 She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. She wants justice for everybody, even for people she doesn't know
All our respondents were engaged in commercial law practice. The first cohort of in-house counsel were employed by a single financial institution, whereas the in-house counsel in the second study provided services to several industries including the financial industry, pharmaceuticals and utilities companies. The pattern of service provision was comparable to the provision by the senior lawyers practising within the commercial law firms who were also surveyed in the second study.
The respondents ranged across a spectrum of length of service with a general emphasis on more experienced lawyers. In particular, in the second survey, post qualification experienced ranged from seven to forty years, with a median of 19 years for those based in a law firm and 25 years for in-house counsel. 83 The first survey cohort had a predominance of male respondents (60% of the total). Whereas, only 22% of the respondents were male in the second survey.
What Are The Values Of Commercial Lawyers? Does It Vary Based On The Form Of Commercial Practice?
The values priorities identified in both surveys were similar (See Table 2 ). Both groups rated benevolence, self-direction and security highly. 84 The values that might be associated with the stereotypical amoral 'lawyer', those of power and stimulation, are located at the bottom of the priorities of both legal populations. Interestingly, from the point of view of lawyers as a conservative occupation, the values encompassed within tradition are lower for this legal sample than the general UK population. 85 Studies suggest that middle adulthood is associated with a reduced emphasis on achievement and stimulation and enhancement of the values encompassed in security, conformity and tradition. 86 This is not reflected in these legal populations: achievement remained a priority value. 87 Although it was less of a priority for inhouse counsel working for the large financial provider, there was little difference in the rating of achievement between the law firm and in-house senior lawyers. The low rating of universalism in the second cohort is particularly unusual. There was one significant difference between the first population of in-house counsel and the second population (in-house and legal firm) and that was the position of universalism. 89 The second population rated the universalism significantly lower than the first population. There was no relationship between gender, or the form of practice, and the rating of the values encompassed within universalism in this population. To assess whether the differences were related to the form of practice, comparisons were made between the values of those who worked in private practice and in-house counsel in the second cohort. There was no significant difference in the ranking of universalism between the two populations, suggesting that the high ranking of universalism in the first population may have been related to the specific cohort. A weaker but possible explanation is that both the private practice and in-house lawyers in the second cohort valued universalism more weakly than 'normal' for lawyers. This is something that would need to be tested on more data with wider groups of lawyers. Once again achievement was lower in those who were employed inhouse compared to those in private practice but this difference did not reach significance.
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Our particular interest is the values associated with zeal. The underpinning assumption is that if zeal is really founded on respect for individual rights, self-sacrifice, fidelity and responsibility then there would be an association between zeal and the values encompassed in self-transcendence (benevolence and universalism). In contrast, if the foundations of zeal are centred on the lawyer's self-interests and personal success, then there would be an association with the values encompassed in self-enhancement (achievement and power).
As we have seen, the value analysis of all the commercial lawyers suggests that commercial lawyers whether practicing in a law firm or as in-house counsel rate values encompassed in benevolence above the values associated with personal interest such as power. This may suggest some fit between the arguments for zeal and its psychological referents, although the relative ranking of universalism is below adult population norms, suggesting that the lawyers studies here care about fairness to others less than the broader adult population from which they are drawn. In the next section, we test this with greater precision by identifying differences in value priorities specifically associated with greater zealous advocacy.
Did values influence answers to ethical questions?
As The client, in other words, gets the benefit of any doubtful situation.
To assess if there is a relationship between values, ethical decision-making and zealous advocacy, the respondents were asked to consider three different ethical scenarios. These scenarios were developed in consultation with experienced practitioners and piloted on a small group of practising lawyers for sense and meaning checks. The first is an ethical dilemma with a legal basis, but which takes place in a domestic context. The aim here was to explore ethics in a non-work context, allowing for the possibility that values might impinge at (say) home but not at work. The remaining dilemmas are situated in a legal professional 90 See the discussion of Perlman (n 1) above, for example. The problem is designed to investigate the extent to which in a situation of modest ambiguity (the transaction is highly likely to be in breach) the lawyer is willing to assist with what could be framed as a cover-up, but is presented neutrally here in a way that a corporate client might present it as 'avoiding regulatory scrutiny'. 98 The answer offered was a simple yes or no to force the respondents to indicate a choice. A lawyer inclined to the view that they must or may do all that they can to assist a client unless there is a clear prohibition on that action is more likely to assist the client by giving the opinion sought in the machine tools. We thus take answering yes to this question as a proxy for taking a more zealous advocacy position. A yes is more likely to be consistent with the kind of zeal that philosophical justifications for zeal seek to justify and less consistent with more restrained versions. 99 In the first cohort, 53 answered the question, of which only three (5%) responded that they would advise the client.
You are advising your Company an engineering company that sells machine tools.
In contrast, 19 (27%) of those practicing in a law firm and 11 (34%) of the in-house lawyers responded positively in the second cohort. The graph represents the values of those who would give advice and those who would not. * p <0.05 98 We have discussed this problem with many in-house lawyers and the dilemma works well. In-housers see the issues and it works well in teasing out a zealous, 'this is not clearly forbidden by law' approach. 99 Of course, once alerted to the possibility that the transaction may be prohibited in some way, professional obligations such as the solicitor's duty to uphold the rule of law and administration of justice are pertinent and there may be an argument that advice in such a situation may constitute the tort of dishonest assistance. It may also be argued that it is an Opinion which should not in fact be given in the best interest of the company. Some of these arguments that could be marshalled in favour of not giving the Opinion are consistent with zeal, but in broad terms they are consistent with restraint of zeal.
The graph shows that those who indicated they would not advise on how to minimise regulatory scrutiny (the majority), valued conformity, tradition and security more highly than those who indicated they would give such advice. The differences were not statistically significant although the influence of conformity and security were near significance.
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There was, however, a significant relationship between achievement and the decision reached.
Those who rated achievement highly were more likely to respond that they would advise the client how to handle the transactions so that the regulator is less likely to scrutinise them. some scholarly proponents have laid claim to a moral justification for zeal. That moral justification is found, in particular, in the notion of lawyers as friends. One critique of zeal is that this moral claim is bogus: client-first is a convenient trope for disguised self-interest.
This paper has explored the empirical validity of this client-first ideal through a value-based analysis of zeal in lawyering. Our data suggest plausible differences in ethical decisionmaking related to those values. The data is consistent with more zealous lawyers having stronger self-rather than client-interested motivation. More zealous lawyers are also less constrained by valuing conformity to rules. If our results are valid, they suggest that the claim that zeal is motivated by placing a high value on the interests of the client is false.
We should emphasis the limits of our study before expanding on its significance. As a convenience sample, we do not claim that our respondents are representative of all commercial lawyers, still less lawyers generally. Concerns about representativeness are partly assuaged because we are measuring differences within the sample; we are looking those who were more or less zealous within a fairly elite group of lawyers. The nature of the group makes it interesting and important in and of itself, but it does not 'prove' that all or most zealous lawyers are motivated by self-interest. It would be useful to replicate the study on wider and alternative groupings of lawyers in commercial law and elsewhere. 103 Similarly, devising problems which explored zeal in a wider range of ways and contexts would similarly help to replicate and render more robust our findings.
Although the survey methodology might be criticised as artificial, our discussions with practitioners suggest the problems used were sufficiently realistic to be testing and to engage them in a genuine endeavour to 'find the right answer' for themselves. That is still some distance from being able to claim the survey shows how respondents would respond to similar ethical dilemmas in real life, but it is a reasonable assumption that their initial framing of such problems in real life would be similar.
In other words, the methods used provide a fresh and meaningful insight into the psychological referents of zeal, and the claims made for zeal as founded in selfless friendship, but we do not claim they are or should be the last word on the topic. psychometric tools can be used to explore one limb of the zealous advocacy argument. Our evidence tends to rebut the claim that zealous advocacy is founded, in part, on a client-centred motivation and support the claim that zeal is a false friend: what distinguishes the motivations of the more and less zealous is self-enhancement. In these two surveys, more zealous lawyers were more motivated by self-interest than other lawyers. The weaker valuing of conformity to rules in the more zealous elements of our cohort is also interesting. As we discussed above, lawyers generally are probably prone to a loyalty bias. Seemingly unknowingly, lawyers may substantially shade their analysis of case merits towards the interests of their client. A weaker valuing of conformity to rules might accentuate or add to this problem.
Also interestingly the findings, if more robustly tested and developed, may suggest problems for jurisprudential justifications of zeal. Remember that there the primary motivation was fidelity to the law: if more zealous advocates are less likely to value conformity to rules then they are less likely to value fidelity to the law. Whilst it is speculation on our part, it is speculation worth voicing; it may even be that in relation to Dare's mere-zeal, it should be restraint and not zeal which is emphasised. A much fuller range of zeal invoking scenarios would need to be tested to look at this adequately though.
Even were such findings to be more widely replicated, we do not claim that the case for zealous advocacy is completely undone by this kind of motivational analysis. The 'client first' type of argument is but one justification for zeal. Other justifications may still have some traction: zeal may be a rationally superior yet psychologically conflicted approach. What our analysis suggests is that it is possible to test, and refute, the claim that zealous lawyers are particularly motivated by benevolence to the client, or concern for justice, or fidelity to the law. It is evidence that the claim that zeal represented an idealised beneficence towards the client is a hollow one. of the lawyer's own interests, rather than those of the client. Our final suggestion of an implication is this: if lawyers think they are helping a client, when in fact they are motivated by helping themselves, then they are more likely to make mistakes which damage the profession and those they serve. Whether we should abandon notions of zeal, temper them with a more sophisticated notion of client centrism 104 or restraint we cannot say -but we should certainly be a little worried about the values at work when lawyers claim that the sine qua non of their professionalism is that they put the clients first.
